I set up Pale Outlaw in November 2011, but have not used it to any great extent. I intended to sound off more – and on a variety of topics – but soon after that I decided to concentrate on writing fiction and researching and reviewing books.
The blog since has since become primarily a repository and record of published material, though that may change.
The Time Capsule contains the full collection of my Irish American News pieces “ From the Motherland”, which commenced in April 2009 and now comprises fifty three pieces ( listed using Roman Numerals). As the title suggests they offer a time capsule for the period in which my take on what was happening is set out.
As the IAN audience is either ex-pat Irish or Irish American – and reasonably well informed about what’s happening in Ireland – I’ve tried to give a certain slant on what’s been in the news and occasionally point up some significant trend or development. As well as the economy and politics, which predominate, I’ve also covered relations with Europe, Neutrality, the Irish Diaspora, RTE, Demographic Trends and Immigration, the Mortgage Crisis and even the Henri Handball. The pieces are limited to 1200 words, which is a useful discipline in itself.
The Book Reviews are chiefly those published in the Irish Independent or on Writing.ie or ones I produced for the local Murder and Mystery book club. Profound or forensic they are not. Most of my private analyses of books tend to concentrate on some aspect of the work ( plot, structure, etc.) and are not publishable. I might add, by way of obiter, that, having “ been there, done that” in the sense of having written a novel and several other pieces of fiction, I have great respect and empathy for other writers. If you haven’t done it – try it. It’s hard work!
The Published Articles are just that – articles published in Irish newspapers and magazines over the past two years.
The Memoirs consist of several pieces based on my past career. It’s a category I hope to expand in the future. Right now it contains several pieces based on my experiences as a European Community Peace Monitor in Croatia and Bosnia.
The Uncategorised and Current Affairs sections contain a number of pieces, several from the IAN before I hit on the Time Capsule appellation, others in which I attempted to sound off, pieces largely unpublished but longer than the 1200 word limit of the IAN. If I do resume sounding off, it will be here.
Finally, Rated Fiction is a small category ( at present) which I plan to expand containing published short fiction where I have the copyright.

July 13 2013



Another EU summit. Are we now entering the Endgame where the Euro is concerned? Or are we again, like the grand old Duke of York, marching the men up only to march them down again? There have been so many “crisis summits” at this stage – and numerous rescue plans – that the wise course for any commentator is to suggest that there will be yet another fudge.

It might be worth recalling a somewhat analogous situation in history (I don’t want to stretch it too far), i.e. that which faced the thirteen American states around 1790, a number of years after independence and just after the Constitution had  been adopted. The situation was  much less complicated than that facing Europe today, but the issues were not totally dissimilar. The new country had no money and faced a huge debt from the revolutionary war. Some of the states had paid off their debts, others had not, could not or would not. There was a North – South division, with up to 80% of the debt owed to Northern bondholders, many of whom had bought the debt at 10 or 15 cents to the dollar.

Alexander Hamilton, First Secretary of the Treasury, proposed that the new nation assume all state debts and fund them by issuing new bonds. There was strong opposition to this, with some states, like Virginia,  objecting to buying out speculators and assuming or writing off the debts of the big borrowers like Massachusetts. Sound familiar? Congress was deadlocked for six months with sectional animosities mounting. Eventually a compromise was hammered out with Hamilton’s plan being adopted at the behest of Jefferson and Madison.  To put it mildly, the plan worked,  even though,  in the early years of the USA, over half of government expenditure went on debt servicing.

Clearly there is a world of difference between the economic problems faced by thirteen pre-industrial states two centuries ago and those currently facing the multi-layered industrial economies of the Eurozone. And there’s not a Hamilton or Jefferson in sight. While there is unlikely to be any clear, sharp, definitive solution embraced by all without qualification at this week’s European Council, all the indications are that we are edging towards a solution that will hold – along the lines of a much closer fiscal and economic union. The alternative is that the Euro will go down the tube, perhaps in weeks, perhaps in months. A two-tier  Euro will not work; who would buy the lower tier? Who would loan on the strength of it?

But there is another aspect. Any closer fiscal union will ultimately involve treaty change. However, some observers have noted that the survival of the Euro cannot await the several years needed to effect this. Some mechanism will have to be devised to short circuit the procedure. The forthcoming European Council may come up with something here. If it does there will presumably be some form of intergovernmental conference in the very short term either to negotiate (possible) or to accept a definite proposal from the countries needed to make the solution work (more likely).  Given the emerging time pressure to save the Euro the issue for Ireland is what position will we adopt on anything that emerges against the background that any treaty change will involve us in a referendum.

Consider our options. And forget about the bank bailout. In the three years since the infamous guarantee was given, we have borrowed around €45 billion – just to keep our inflated and bloated economy and welfare system ticking over – and that’s without a cent for the banks. Our  recent so-called harsh budgets have hardly made a dent in this structural deficit.  It’s already matching what we will, over time, pay for the banks, and it’s increasing by €50 million every day. The cause of the deficit is clear and, again, has nothing to do with the banks, but seems to be ignored by most of the media and the prevailing public culture of entitlement.

Government revenues collapsed as the air escaped from the Celtic Tiger. The fatal and inexcusable narrowing of the tax base during the years of plenty coupled with an equally inexcusable spree of increase in welfare payments left the economy beached, and obliged to borrow heavily. Masochists can google the website www.budget.ie  and read the disaster as it unfolded from the column on the left – previous budgets. Read McCreevy’s boast in the 2002 budget speech that  “after this budget there will be over 690,000 income earners outside the tax net, or  37% of all those on Revenue’s records”.

It gets worse. Cowen, speaking on the 2007 budget boasted “ that nearly two out of every five earners (or 846,000 persons) will be outside the tax net in 2007 compared to one third (or 677,000 persons) in 2004 and one quarter (or 380,000 persons) in 1997. This is a highly significant development.” It was – it was a disaster. What modern economy, with aspirations towards good governance can sustain a situation where 40% of the workforce pay no tax? Meanwhile welfare benefits were  jacked up disproportionately – one commentator has calculated that  child benefit increased under Fianna fail by 330%, the dole by 130% and the standard old age pension by 120%, over a period when inflation amounted to  40%. Even half that largesse applied elsewhere would have been enough for a universal  single tier health service and more besides.

The piper was calling for payment even before the bank guarantee; remember the October 2008 budget to try to deal with the collapse in revenue? Indeed the two budgets in 2009 (April and December – which introduced  a new word for reductions in pay and benefits  – “adjustments”)  were calculated with the bank bailout almost as a side issue. The full extent of bailing out the banks when known gave us a hefty  shove over the precipice for which we were heading; could we have avoided it without the banks? Take a moment to reflect.

So. We have “lost our economic sovereignty”. A disaster? Since no one would lend to us , except at unsustainable interest rates, we are now relying ion Europe and the IMF? How exactly would we function without them? Renege on our debts? Who would  give us credit? Burn the unsecured bondholders? Who then would secure our credit? Leave the Eurozone? What level would the “Punt Nua” settle at  and where would our welfare system be then? And what has been demanded of us? A property tax? Virtually every other country in Europe has one. A water tax? Ditto. Increases in taxes and cuts in spending to help bridge the fiscal gap? Is this so unreasonable – particularly when  we are left to decide on the detail ourselves?

There’s a further level of myth to be faced. Underpinning it, something which has been gaining currency (a dreadful pun!) in recent months,  is that Germany in particular, and also France, have been acting as bullies towards the rest of the Eurozone. “To protect their banks”. Maybe. To protect their economies, and the Eurozone. Certainly.  Had we not had our national economic tsunami would we have expected any less of them? How would we perform in their position? And, specifically, what solutions would we have, were we to be suddenly the major  player, rather than a very minor one, to the  whole Eurozone crisis. Again, take a moment to reflect. Big boys games; big boys rules.

Reflect also on Greece. The whole Greek drama has yet to play out fully. We still don’t know if it will end up a comedy,  a tragedy, or a farce. When Merkel and Sarkozy called time, it was to remind the Greeks that the issue in any referendum was not whether the rescue package should be approved, but rather that it was the only package available and that, if Greece wanted to continue to be assisted, it should vote on the only issue that mattered, whether it wanted to remain within the Eurozone. Where else would Greece get the money to continue to function?  What will happen to Greece remains to be seen. The write-down of Greek debt was because Greece’s borrowing had put it in the economic basket case category. Ireland is not in that situation;  do we want to go there?

What options then do we have? The myth, and it’s a dangerous one, is that we have a power of veto, that we can tell off those nasty Germans and French, tell them we will not wear their solution and that they had better come up with another plan. Mickawber-like we await a solution which will lift our burden of debt so that we can continue on regardless. Any solution will require treaty change and they know our record in that regard. It will not be too long before someone latches on to the 1790 solution in the US, which would suit us –the ECB becoming a type of Federal Reserve, and underwriting all Europe’s debts, including our own. With one bound the Irish hero would be free!  And if we don’t like the small print – more outside control over our economy – we can threaten our veto until we get our way.

It is true we cannot be thrown out of the EU. That would require unanimity and we are unlikely to vote for that ourselves. But we could be frozen out and left behind. There was talk in Europe some years ago – faced with British foot-dragging – that  a central core of countries might proceed to a deeper and closer union. Arguably the Eurozone represented a manifestation of this, though hardly a successful one. Schengen is another  example in operation, even if reluctance by some countries to admit immigrants has wiped the gloss off.  However, these examples show that it is possible for a group of member states to act together without the rest.

What then would happen were a solution acceptable to all except Ireland rejected by an Irish veto? This would not be a Nice, or a Lisbon. The stakes would be much higher. The alternative would be economic meltdown. We might get a second chance. Or Europe might decide to move forward – without us. Forget the veto. What is  to prevent a new and identically worded  treaty being put forward, identical except that it excluded references to Ireland? And Europe moved on without us – and perhaps one or two others. Unlikely? Probably. Improbable? Yes.

Impossible? The European Union would continue, but a new body would function alongside it. We should recall that the League of Nations continued to function throughout the Second World War. Indeed an Irishman, Sean Lester, became its last Secretary General in 1940. But by then the League had ceased to function in any meaningful sense; the major players had departed. Since 2008 we have seen developments until then thought unthinkable become reality. These are uncertain times. Do we want to be left on the field on our own?



“Nothing odd will do long” – Samuel Johnson

New hollow shells silhouette the landscape,

From houses half built to multi-storey frames.

The vista mirroring a decade’s progress.

Hope and hubris like weed and shrub commixed;

The mirage of easy wealth for most dispelled

As realism takes hold. Change comes but slowly

To reject, replace, beliefs found wanting,

The worship of property, the siren of cheap credit,

The trust in men who lead and men who lend.

Measured against our past, is now then bad?

There is no famine, hunger or disease,

No racking poverty, no emigrant ships

No quiet rural emptying out; no despair.

What can we place to balance in the scales?

Ephemeral prosperity? Folly and fancy?

Our ancestors would laugh could we commune,

And offer to change places if they could,

And bid us to face forward and not back,

And take to heart Doctor Johnson’s words

That nothing odd lasts.


Ireland is to close three diplomatic missions, including the Embassy to the Vatican. The
announcement last week has been received with gung ho  enthusiasm by the Catholic –bashers and mixed
feelings by many others I have no mixed feelings. Closing two of the three is a

Take the Vatican first. Whatever the faults and failings of the Vatican’s
reaction to the child abuse issue, which is a horizontal one affecting the
Catholic Church in a number of countries, and is something that  Rome will have to work out satisfactorily,
there are other issues. Nationally, the majority of the Irish population remain
Catholic, with all that that implies. Like it or not, they have views.  While all have been shocked by the clerical
sexual abuse saga (still very much a small part – though high profile – of
those accused and/or convicted of sexual abuse of children)  poking the Pope in the eye, metaphorically,
will  not necessarily sit well with them.

Internationally, the Vatican provides a focal point for the
world’s one billion plus Catholics, the second largest religious grouping in
the world, and one which  includes powerful and numerous communities across the globe. It can tap into
missionaries, locally based churches and lay communities. It appoints all
Catholic bishops worldwide, including the Irish ones. Internationally also the
Vatican’s diplomatic network is extensive and highly regarded. The net result
is that the Vatican is a storehouse of information and analysis and is regarded
as an important ”listening post” and  a very useful resource to tap into, something diplomats on the ground can avail
of. As a country with a small diplomatic service, and limited resources,
Ireland should be looking to foster links of this type, not walk away from

Certainly the Irish Embassy to the Vatican “yields no
economic return”. It never did. This presumably applies also to the large
number of states which maintain resident embassies to the Holy See, but there
is no sign that they are rushing to close their missions. Yet the Vatican IS
important to Ireland, as witness the curious decision to seek to appoint the
Secretary General of the Department, i.e. Ireland’s most senior diplomat, as
non-resident Ambassador, with the implication that he/she will have the full
resources of the Department available should the need arise.

Normally a non-resident accreditation is of an existing, usually adjacent,  ambassador, whose
functions are confined to at most several visits per annum and who receives
little or no extra resources for the secondary accreditation. Since Rome, one
of our relatively large Embassies (i.e. more than one person and a dog) is not
acceptable to the Vatican, the judgement has been made that none of the other
diplomatic missions nearby, which are stretched in any event, would have the resources
– time or personnel – to handle the Vatican. Clearly the thinking is that
another brouhaha like the recent one would need to be handled seriously. Yet
that begs the question why close the Embassy. Surely a more subtle approach,
such as leaving the post of Ambassador vacant
for a year or two, could have been tried. The cost of keeping the
mission open would hardly break a broke nation.

Timor-Leste was never more than a development aid office in
any event and it appears that sufficient progress has taken place there to
judge than this office can be closed.

That leaves Iran. The decision to close our Embassy there is
mystifying. So, trade has not lived up to expectations. Surely the answer,
shouted from politicians and officialdom in respect of everything else, is to
try harder and work harder. And if Iran is indeed a tough nut from the trade
point of view, it will hardly prove easier without some local knowledge and
presence on the ground. Last year, incidentally, we exported €81 million plus
to Iran; it was the fifth year in a row in which exports increased and they are
now significantly higher than the lows of a decade ago. Our total exports to
eight of the twelve post-2004 EU accession states over the past three years
have averaged €300 million per year; do the maths.

Iran has a proud history. It was and is a significant player
in the region. It is, moreover, the nineteenth largest economy in the world,
roughly the size, in GDP terms, of Australia and Poland and has an estimated
GDP per head of $13,000. It has a population close to 80 million, is
strategically and geopolitically important and, inter alia with its energy
reserves, is a potential regional superpower. It is also fast developing a nuclear
capability which could see it become the second Islamic nuclear power with
possible  profound  ramifications for the whole Middle East. From
what one can judge there is considerable social ferment within the country
which could presage change sooner rather than later. By closing the embassy
Ireland will be shutting herself off from monitoring developments there and
will certainly be unable to interact, influence or mediate, even to a limited

These closures have been justified by  the declared necessity
to implement cuts across the board in view of the current woeful financial situation.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, minus the development cooperation element, is one of the smaller government
departments. Most of its budget is spent on the upkeep of missions abroad,
rents salaries and allowances. Savings can only be made, therefore, by closing
overseas  missions. The McCarthy Report
actually recommended that Ireland should reduce the number of its overseas
missions from 76 to 55, without, as far as I can see, specifying which or why.
If three is the extent of the closures, we should be relieved. Ireland has a
relatively small, relatively inexpensive foreign service. Most of the missions
are tiny – one or two diplomats with limited clerical back-up – and are
expected to deliver on a varied range of duties, including helping Irish
citizens in distress. It should be noted that most criticisms of this
“consular” role either misrepresent what embassies can and should do in
situations or occur in countries where Ireland has no direct representation on
the ground – as was the case in Libya earlier this year.

It seems illogical to me to close any of Ireland’s  missions at a time when the message from the
politicians seems to be “Export or Perish”. Indeed look at where we are NOT
represented directly. In South and Central America we have three (3!) resident
embassies, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina; Mexico, with three diplomats, is
doubly accredited to Cuba, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela! We have
one embassy in North Africa (Egypt). We have no one on the ground in six of the
world’s 35 largest economies, including Indonesia (15), Thailand (25), Pakistan
(27), Colombia (28), the Philippines(32) and Venezuela (34). Strategically
placed embassies have multiple secondary accreditations (Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Moscow), which they try to service with two or three diplomats. Canada, with three diplomats, also
covers Jamaica! And now we are to close Iran.

If we ARE to close missions how about a radical approach by thinking
outside the box a little? It has been argued that the Vatican embassy was a
sort of sacred cow (pun not intended), which has now been slain. In the context
of examining Ireland’s diplomatic representation, and in particular getting
more for the buck, another sacred cow might be looked at. This is the mantra
that Ireland should have an embassy in every EU member state. And we have. This
was ok when the EU was Twelve, or even Fifteen, but it is now Twenty Seven,
with Croatia poised to join and a queue from the Balkans round the corner. IF
yielding economic return is to be the criterion for an embassy on the ground,
take those trade figures I mentioned above. Do we need three embassies in the
Baltics? Do we need embassies in those of the Central European member states
included in the eight bracketed together in our trade statistics? Five or six
of these missions could be closed or consolidated freeing up the diplomatic
staff for redeployment elsewhere, either in new posts or to beef up missions
such as China, India or Russia, whereextra staff dedicated to commercial activity would not go amiss and
where we have some way to go before the law of diminishing returns kicks in.

Another avenue to be looked at might be to pursue the
Vatican option and cover certain posts from HQ. We already cover a number of
small states from our UN Mission in New York. In the era of Internet and emails,
and in view of the additional layers of frequent  meetings of officials across all areas of EU
competence and in areas of political and judicial cooperation, do we really
need Irish embassies on the ground in e.g. Scandinavia? Sweden closed its
embassy in Dublin several years ago, without any dire consequences. Why should
we not follow suit? An officer of appropriate rank sitting at H.Q. – where
there is already a regional desk system in operation – could surely function as
efficiently, and at far less cost, than an officer en poste. The Nordic posts
could be closed , with the exception of one, to provide consular assistance as required.
We can probably suppress one or two other EU missions, like Belgium and
Luxembourg since the our mission to the EU in Brussels can cover; ditto Switzerland
, with our UN mission in Geneva to cover. But No! Shock, Horror! Last year
Belgium was our second largest export market in the EU after Britain, and Switzerland
was our second largest non-EU market. If economic return is to be the criterion
then these missions, small as they are, definitely justify their existence.

The last two paragraphs were tongue-in-cheek. I hope the
point is taken up.. Ireland’s diplomatic service has a job to do. One element
of this is trade promotion in the broadest sense. But this cannot be allowed to
degenerate into hucksterism. Our diplomats represent Ireland and are required
to maintain appropriate levels of dignity and behaviour. Few would have it any
other way. The immediate financial savings in closing Tehran and the Vatican are
miniscule and may cost us more in the longer run. Let us hope there will be a more
critical and public scrutiny of any proposals for further closures.


A favourite story of mine occurs in various forms but is usually attributed to
a character in Islamic folklore, Nasruddin. The story concerns a man who has
offended or outraged a king and is ordered to be put to death. He pleads for
his life and tells the king that, if spared for a year he will teach the king’s
horse to talk. The king accepts the offer but promises a worse death one year
on if the man fails to deliver.

The man is upbraided by his friends for his foolishness. He responds: “I have
gained a year. In that year I might die. The king might die. The horse might
die. The king might change his mind. And who knows….I might even teach the
horse to talk.” The moral being that much can happen in a year. The corollary
is that forecasting what will happen can be difficult.

Take the Irish Presidential election. By the time you read this Ireland will
have a new President. With seven candidates and given our quirky electoral
system, the race at this stage is too close to call . It has been fascinating.
The last two Presidents have, with style and energy, transformed a role that is
largely ceremonial, raising the stakes for all candidates this time round. The
attempt by Sinn Fein to supplant Fianna Fail as the major opposition force by
running its strongest candidate , Martin McGuinness, has added to the contest.

Indeed who wins is just one of the interesting aspects of the campaign. The
results, including the voting transfers between the candidates, will be studied
closely to see whether the remarkable outcome of the general election last
February was a once-off or whether it marked a sea-change in Irish politics.
Together with the accompanying by-election – to fill the seat vacated by Brian
Lenihan’s death (what had been Fianna Fail’s only seat left in Dublin) – the
Presidential poll gives the first opportunity to stocktake.There are signs that
the Teflon coating on the new government is starting to crack with its room for
manoeuvre circumscribed by the IMF as the first painful budget approaches.

Certainly there is a new volatility among a large section of the Irish
electorate, a willingness to be ultra – critical and to “throw the bums out” if
they are perceived to have failed to deliver. In February this led to a
collapse in the Fianna Fail vote, with much of its traditional support seceding
along class lines, middle class to Fine Gael, working class to Labour,
republicans to Sinn Fein.

Since then Fianna Fail has signally failed to recover and has seen its support
decline further in the polls, culminating in its decision not to contest the
Presidential election. In vain has the party leadership pointed out that the
new government is doing little beyond following the Fianna Fail blueprint for
economic recovery. So far the electorate has seen through that one – the
programme for recovery, negotiated with EU and IMF guns to the head, would
never have been necessary in the first place had Fianna Fail not wrecked the

Fianna Fail now faces a challenge for its self-proclaimed Republican soul, this
time in a head to head with Sinn Fein, which is also stealing what is left of
its populist quasi left-wing appeal. It can do nothing about it as it still
tarred with the brush of economic mismanagement as well as the harsh programme
of recovery. The omens do not appear good. Already some analysts are drawing
analogies with what happened in Northern Ireland, where Sinn Fein has
shouldered aside the SDLP.

Sinn Fein has a formidable party machine and a hard –headed leadership. And, it
should not be forgotten, two decades ago a sizeable rump of the political wing
of the Official IRA began the odyssey that led to membership of a government
coalition (as the Democratic Left), before eventually merging with the Labour
Party, where it soon took over leadership. Could this process be about to be
repeated, ceteris paribus?

Lest we forget, however, these events in Ireland have a slightly “phoney war”
feel to them They are taking place against the background of on-going
uncertainty in the international economy We have our own problems, and we are grappling
with them. Indeed we’ve earned brownie points for being the good guys and
taking our medicine within the EU, unlike the Greeks. The current popular line
is that Ireland will be well placed to take advantage of the world economic
recovery, when it comes. In one form or another all the political parties buy
into this line.

Whether we can deal with the debt mountain tends to be glossed over, or, in a
classic example of doublethink, our debt is dismissed as being something that
will be subsumed in the new arrangements to follow a realignment of the world
financial situation.This may well be, but there seems little or no appreciation
of, and certainly no informed debate on, the collateral damage for Ireland that
any such realignment would entail or, indeed of the type of catastrophic global
economic situation which would necessitate such a realignment.

The Left, with Sinn Fein as cheerleader in chief, has embraced with enthusiasm
the localised alternative of a national debt default. This tends to be viewed
through Micawberish spectacles, an approach reinforced, up to now, by the
perceived pussyfooting approach of the EU heavy hitters to the struggles of
Greece actually to implement a rolling programme of austerity. The grim reality
of what was involved for ordinary people when Argentina defaulted, or when the
Russian economy collapsed, has had little airing here. What happened in a
remote country far away could never happen to Ireland! Sadly, it could.

Here again crystal ball gazing can prove difficult. The international economy
may well go into meltdown. As the cliché would have it we are now in uncharted
waters.And if the world economy does collapse the next generation of economic
commentators and pundits will point to the events of the last three years-
since Lehman collapsed – and will conclude that the signs were there for all to
see, that there was a sequence of events almost teleological in nature which
brought about the collapse.Frankly the only things clear at the moment are that
the future is a hidden book and that the major political leaders worldwide are
agreed only on their fear of the unknown and what the future may bring.

Much can happen in a year. Greece may well default over the next twelve months,
in a process that began earlier and with consequences that will long persist.
Ireland seems to have bottomed out economically in some respects but the when
and how of recovery is contingent on many factors. We may get a helping hand –
Eurobonds or a common Eurozone debt have been talked about. So has a
fundamental restructuring of the Euro and the EU constitution itself.There are
even references to how the young USA launched the Dollar in 1790. What will
happen? Who can tell? The political obstacles to surmount seem almost as
formidable as teaching a horse to talk.”



Despite our economic woes somebody out there likes us and
wants to come here to live! The very first results of the 2011 census have
appeared – the headcount. They show that the population of the republic has
risen to 4,581,269, an increase of 340,000, or 8.1%, since 2006. The size of
the increase came as a surprise to officialdom, exceeding estimates by 100,000.
It would appear that, in addition to a high birth rate, more people arrived and
stayed and fewer left than had been thought. Given that even now living
standards here (and the social welfare system) compare favourably with those in
Central Europe and the Baltics, let alone the third world, should anyone have
been surprised?

The 2011 figures suggest at the very least that one of the
common official assumptions concerning inward migration needs revisiting, i.e.
that many of those who came “for work” during the Tiger Years would leave when
the economy imploded. Certainly some have, and the number arriving has
diminished, yet many more have stayed. The actual figures will not become clear
until more detailed data from the census becomes available next year, but
recent contacts and exchanges I have had with just three embassies in Dublin
paint a very interesting picture. The myth of the mobile transient Polish
building worker needs to be put to rest.

There are now probably 200,000 Poles living in Ireland,
anything up to 100,000 Lithuanians and 30,000 Latvians. These three
nationalities alone now comprise 7% of the country’s population. Anyone who has
been an emigrant, or is familiar with the pattern of Irish emigration over the
years will not be surprised, given the numbers who came to Ireland from 2004
on. Once the emigration pain barrier of several years has been reached,
experience suggests that a good proportion of immigrants will stay, put down
roots, develop relationships and start families. These people are not going

Similar considerations apply to the 75,000 immigrants from
three other Central European EU states -the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Hungary, who arrived here  during the
boom ( to end 2008). It’s fair to assume that they have stayed on in much the
same proportion as the others, i.e. anything up to 50,000. Moreover, though the
numbers arriving from these six EU states have declined sharply since 2008, PPS
registrations for the six (our equivalent of social security numbers) in 2009
totalled 26,000, in 2010 18,500 and, in the first five months of 2011, 6000.
Poles continue to register at over 100 per week. Again, it is reasonable to
assume that most of these late comers, who came with their eyes open,
post-boom, are still here.

These EU migrants had one other thing in common – no
restriction on the right to work in Ireland. People from non-EU countries, and
Romania and Bulgaria after 2007, require work permits, and, in terms of
receiving  welfare benefits, must meet
the criteria for “habitual residence”
regulations introduced by Ireland and others of the “richer” EU states
after 2004 to combat welfare shopping by immigrants ( and, incidentally,
applied to incoming Irish citizens and returned emigrants). The total number of
new work permits issued to all nationalities in 2008 was 8481, declining to
4024 in 2009 and 3394 in 2010. Romanians received just under 1100 of

Nevertheless, 22,000 Romanians received PPS numbers in 2007
and 2008 and a further 5,500 in 2009 and 2010; around 1500 have done so this year.
The figures for Brazilians (who received slightly over 500 new work permits
since 2008) are even more startling. This is a non – EU state with which
Ireland has few historical or trading links (unlike Argentina, where there is a
large population of Irish descent). Between 2006 and 2008 almost 14,000
Brazilians received PPS numbers, in 2009 2741, while the figure for 2010 was
4257 (as against 143 Argentinians). To date in 2011 2553 PPS numbers have
issued to Brazilians, almost as many as to Poles. Again, presumably most of the
latest arrivals plus a good proportion of those who have arrived since 2007
have stayed. Ditto with regard to those coming from third world countries,
roughly 8000 in 2010. The message is clear. Despite our current economic difficulties,
Ireland continues to be attractive to those coming from poorer societies.

To complete the picture there is more affluent immigration
also and, all told, in 2010, around 70,000 PPS numbers were issued to non-Irish
people (the 85,130 issued to Irish people were, with a few exceptions, to
babies), a rate being maintained this year, despite the economic situation.
While emigration has picked up the net inflow continues and, as the census has
revealed, its extent has been underestimated.

The consequences of continued strong inward migration have
received little public attention. While there was considerable coverage and
hand-wringing over estimates of up to 50,000 young Irish people emigrating last
year, there has been little or no focus on the fact that 35,000 plus arrived
here last year as economic migrants. Clearly should this trend continue, on top
of the current situation, it will add considerably to the problem of tackling
unemployment, still stubbornly high at 450,000.

The recovery of the
90s took place initially with no inward migration, a static or declining
population and a work force in which women were underrepresented. This has now
changed utterly, and, while there are almost daily announcements of new jobs in
the multinational sector, they are not impacting on the total out of work. Like
Spain, Ireland may be entering a period with chronic high levels of
unemployment compounded by immigration and, in Ireland’s case, a demographic  structure which promises a continued high
birth rate.

The detailed breakdown of the population by age, nationality
or ethnic origin etc. will become clear as more of the census results become
available, but, generally, more people means more pressure on resources. At a
time of financial stringency this will cause the state some headaches but there
is  one potential silver lining. More
people also means more demand, including for accommodation, so an economic
recovery should see a surge in demand for housing, helping to solve the
overhang of excess housing units and correct the current imbalance.

Having a sizeable percentage of the population non Irish
raises other issues, which were pointed to in the 2006 Census, but which are
likely to become more pressing. Not least of these relates to democratic
representation. Only citizens can vote, but any review of the Constitution
(which is being mooted) can hardly ignore the issue of the vote for non-nationals.
The issue of multiculturalism also needs addressing in a more coherent way than
up to now. The data from the Census will be critical in this regard.

Some historical perspective. The current population figure
of almost 4.6 million is still far short of the 1841 total of 6.5 million for
the 26 county area, and, while the population of Leinster is now one third
higher, the population of Munster is a little over half the pre-Famine level,
while those of Connacht and Ulster are 60% less. It will take a lot more inward
migration to dent that shortfall.